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Is it possible, after all, that we may be fooling ourselves in think-
ing that history teaches us something? The volume of histories written 
may be only a retelling of the mistakes that the future is destined to make 
on a greater scale. Although much of this history is at times wearying, 
there is always the unusual, the dramatic, and the singular event that 
claims our various interests. The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota 
was one such event for the writer of this paper. 
Our knowledge of any past event is ·always incomplete, inaccurate 
to some degree, confused by opposing viewpoints of historians, obscured 
by partisan sources, and perhaps distorted by our own bias. The highly 
controversial nature of the Nonpartisan League and the emotional nature 
of the disloyalty charges that raged around it make this topic doubly 
ambivalent. It is the purpose of this paper to try to determine the 
validity, or lack of it, and the purposes served by the accusations of 
disloyalty used by the League opposition i.n efforts to bring discredit to 
this virulent political movement. 
The writer approached the study of this topic by a survey of books, 
articlesl newspapers, Nonpartisan League manuscripts and publications, 






materials made available through the History Department and Library staff 
at the University of North Dakota were extensive. The author wishes to 
compliment these people and profess his gratitude for their excellent, 
congenial assistance, without which very little of this writing could have 
been achieved. 
Gaps in source materials and difficulties in finding information arise 
primarily from the absence of records, which was the result of a noticeable 
tendency of League leadership to conduct affairs without writing things 
down and a pronounced failure to maintain records. The failure may have 
been calculated to some degree . 
The topics that the writer wishes to examine within the paper are: 
The Progressive and reform movements in relation to the unique 
forces of population that contributed to them in North Dakota at the turn 
of the century which aided development of the Nonpartisan League. 
The roles of two leading figures of the Nonpartisan League, Arthur 
C. Townley and William Lemke, and their anti-war positions as dis-
played by their speeches and correspondence, as well as how historians 
and biographers have interpreted these men's ideas. 
The Nonpartisan League 1 s principles and programs toward profiteer-
ing and huge business combines, and the control these forces held over 
government. 
Support by the Nonpartisan League and North Dakotans for the 




The origin of charges of disloyalty which led to criminal prosecu-
tion of League leaders, and the use made of these charges by League 
opponents. 
The validity connected with the proposition that, without changes 
resulting from World War I, the loyalty attacks by opponents of the 
League would not have seriously discomfited the League. 
The League as a matter of principle had always opposed excessive 
profits reaped by monopolization and trust building, business control of 
political processes through control of party politics, a biased and 
irresponsible press serving the interests of privilege and politicians, 
unequal distribution of wealth and unequal taxation, and political and 
economic domination of land and production by absentee wealth or power. 
The League believed remedying these evils. by state ownership and 
regulation of mills, banks, insurance companies, transportation lines, 
newspapers, and wholesale suppliers of equipment necessary for produc-
tion. They supported the concepts of progressive taxation on profits, 
self-determinism of all populations, and initiative public state, national, 
and international negotiations and policymaking. 
While the League had successfully demonstrated the validity of its 
economic goals, it allowed itself to be entangled in the philosophical 
issues of patriotism by its opponents who found issues with emotional 
charge more important and appealing than dry economics. We seek an 
answer to the question: "Was the League unpatriotic, or did the war 




PROGRESSIVISM, TWENTIETH-CENTURY, AND NORTH DAKOTA 
Most historians of twentieth-century America would agree that the 
effective beginnings of contemporary reform ideals can be traced to the 
Progressive Era. David W. Noble, in an article published in the American 
Quarterly, stated that: 
Progress, for the average American of the nineteenth-
century, was a law whose validity y.ra s beyond doubt. 
During the first decade and a half of the next--our 
present--century, this deep-rooted affirmation reached a 
high point of intensity, calling forth an emotional and 
intellectual enthusiasm that has indelibly labeled these 
years as the Progressive Era. 1 
The influence of immigration, growth of urbanization, and intellectual 
associations of Charles Darwin 1 s thoughts on evolution with a definition 
of progress all combined to bolster these demands for reform. 
In the capitalist economy that had developed during the nineteenth-
century, the stress on freedom for personal choice to be good or evil had 
been interpreted by the. defenders of the system in a way that justified 
concentration of wealth as natural and inevitable. American capitalists 
maintained that inequalities were not only natural and inborn, but also 
tended t6 expand with the growth of civilization. Competition was the 
4 
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life of growth, and business was the essence of competition. Hereditary 
inequalities bred social and artificial inequalities within which the 
strong gained control over technological innovations and became 
stronger; the weak became relatively weaker. The acceptance of this 
rationalization carried with it the conclusion that the concentration of 
wealth would be periodically alleviated by violent or peaceable partial 
redistribution. 2 
Progressives countered by saying that the weak are devoured in 
nature by the strong. Man in civili-zation attempts to consume other men 
by due process of law. Unless the masses are protected by the power of 
rules or collective action, abuse is inevit.able. The Progressives 
believed also that cooperation was a reality increased by social develop-
ment and became a form of competition. Men cooperated in the group, 
community, club, party, and nation in order to strengthen their competi-
tive position with others. These competitive groups took on the qualities 
of competing individuals: acquisitiveness, pugnacity, partisanship, 
pride, fear, and hate. Political, and non-political, parties were the 
state's fulfillment of this natural competition. 
In the Social Darwinist's interpretation of capitalism, each stage 
of man's development was seen as being in competition with the next. 
It was once said that "civilization is a parasite on the man with the 
hoe. 11 But the man with the hoe no longer existed in the most advanced 
areas of the country in 1·900. The man with the hoe was becoming the 
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hand at the wheel of a tractor or combine. Agriculture was becoming an 
industry, and the farmer would have to make his choice between being 
the employee of a capitalist or the employee of a state. 
The struggle between socialism and capitalism was, and is, 
according to the defenders of the latter, part of the historic rhythm in 
the concentration and dispersion of wealth. In the industrial stage of 
man's existence, "the men who can manage men manage the men who 
can manage only things, and the men who can manage money manage 
all. 113 This was the rationale of entrepeneurial capitalism in the last 
half of the nineteenth-century. The bankers watched the trends in 
agriculture, industry, and trade; and they invited and directed the flow 
of capital by controlling loans and interest and enterprise. They ran 
great risks to make great gains, and they rose to the top of the heap if 
they were the "fittest to survive. 11 
According to this theory every economic system beyond the agricul-
tural stage had to depend upon sorrie form of profit motive to convince 
individuals to continue productivity beyond their own needs. 4 The 
capitalist was only fulfilling a creative function in history. He had 
gathered the savings of people into productive capital by assuring his 
suppliers of interest and dividends. He was thus able to finance the 
mechanization of industry and agriculture, which had created such a 
flow of goods from producer to consumer as history had never seen 




over the laws of supply and demand, as well as the regulation of legisla-
tures, could give the public a greater abundance of food, homes, comfort, 
and leisure than had ever come from politically managed economies. The 
"Great American Way" preached that in free enterprise, competition and a 
healthy zeal for ownership encouraged productiveness and inventiveness, 
which in turn allowed every person with ability to find a place for his 
talents, and the natural selection of skills would return just ·rewards. 
Basic democracy ruled the process when most articles to be produced, 
and the services to be rendered, were determined by ·consumer demand 
rather than by government decree. The nature of competitiveness did 
compel the capitalist to exhaustive labor, and his products were con-
stantly improved in excellence. There was a little truth to such claims 
in the last half of the nineteenth-century. 
These claims of capitalism, however, did not satisfy the need for 
an explanation about why history was full of protests and revolts against _ 
abuses by industrial masters, price manipulation, business chicanery, 
and irresponsible use of wealth-giving resources. Crusted with age, 
these abuses have called forth socialist experiments in many places and 
times in history. 
The Progressive Era was one during which the concentration of 
wealth reached such a point that the strength of numbers among the many 
poor .was hardly able to rival the power of the few rich. This unstable 
equilibrium generated a critical situation which the reformers hoped to 
) 
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remedy by legislative redistribution, because revolutionary means of 
adjusting inequalities were odious to them. Imbued with a mixture of 
selfish and altruistic motives, reinforced by decreasing real income as a 
result of the price inflation that came about in 1897, middle-class 
r~formers set out to right the errors of their society. 5 They wished to 
secure legislation providing for more democratic methods within the 
political machinery, which would break the power of corrupt bosses who 
manipulated unfortunate an_d unknowing immigrant voters. They hoped to 
expose and curtail the practices of -unscrupulous businessmen whose 
maneuvers were subverting good government. 
Between 1900 and 1920, American statute books became studded 
with the results of people-oriented reform drives. The direct primary, 
the initiative, the Clayton Act, the Seventeenth Amendment, a revived 
Interstate Commerce Commission, workmen's compensation, child labor 
laws, and Prohibition--these and many other achievements testified to 
the intensity of Progressivism. 
The multitude of reform groups during the period had augmented the 
government's role as the watchdog over the economy--a role not yet 
fully accepted in the United States. Their purpose was either to main-
tain the traditional 11 small business" regime of competitive free enter-
prise they believed existed, or at least to make sure that oligopolists 
really made consumer benefits available from their large scale opera-
tions. 6 It is admitted that all that was done in the name of reform might 
) 
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not have been an improvement. In his article, "Urban Liberalism and the 
Age of Reform, 11 J. Joseph Huthmacher stated: 
Some measures, notably Prohibition, are counted today as 
being wrong-headed, while some political panaceas like the 
direct primary elicited an undue degree of optimism on the 
part of their exponents. 7 
It was, however, through the effective use of the primary that the Non-
partisan League of North Dakota gained its first political power and 
recognition. 
The impact of westward expansion, industrial growth, and the con-
centration of wealth and political power, of concern throughout the 
country, seemed to have especial relevance for North Dakotans at the 
turn of the century. Elwyn B. Robinson has described the situation at 
that time as one in which the state was virtually an exploited colony of 
eastern business interests. 8 In Robert L. Morlan' s Political Prairie Fire, 
we find the opinion that the state was controlled by an oligarchy of grain 
and railroad interests not located in North Dakota, but directed from 
Minneapolis and St. Paul--the banking, milling, and railroad head-
quarters of the reg ion. 9 
The first great attraction which drew· the permanent settler to the 
region was the agricultural wealth promised by the Red River Valley. 
Coming at the heighth of optimism and expectations of Progressivism, 
the homeisteaders felt that everything could be made continuously better. 
Many brought with them Progressive or Populist ideals from the East or 
10 
Europe. They could see that North Dakota was the perfect place to 
institute the ideas of Progressivism before the abuses and corruptions of 
industrialization had complicated their agrarian way of life. The Non-
partisan League of North Dakota embodied all of the influences that 
spread throughout the United States with the Progressive Era and its 
ideals of reform can easily be found in this exceptional movement. The 
formulation of Nonpartisan League policies embodied elements of 
populism, anti-monopolism, agrarianism, and Socialism. 
Considered as a mass movement, Progressfvism was a response of 
the average man to the challenges to his accustomed or hoped-for status; 
much of Progressive sentiment was clearly directed toward regaining the 
"good old days. 11 Nevertheless, the predominant social thinkers of this 
movement, while illuminating attendant abuses, accepted the fact of the 
new industrial forces; indeed, they more than accepted; they waxed 
eloquent about the promise of the future. 
Then, suddenly and without warning, the tragedy of World War I 
burst upon this generation and, amidst the smoke of battle, the Progres-
sive Era vanished. Seldom I if ever I has there been such a sharp and 
clear division of periods in American history as there was between that 
of the Progressive Era and that which succeeded it. Americans have con-
tinued to believe in progress; but the assurance, the certainty, and the 
clos~ identification of this idea with a total moral reawakening have 
gradually receded. 
11 
David W. Noble, in "The Paradox of Progressive Thought" tells us: 
The simplicity of conditions that had fostered faith in progre.ss 
had disappeared and with their disappearance went the naive 
belief in the inevit~bility of progress. When thinking of this 
process by which Americans were divested of their innocence 
and faith, it is convenient to take World War I as the symbolic 
opening moment, a sharp. and harsh beginning but only the 
beginning, for major ideas are not obliterated by a single 
historical event. 10 
The past history of America contains no more unusual set of circum-
stances than that through which many of the leading thinkers of the 
Progressive movement were destroyed in effectiveness. In the short 
period of six years, from 1914 to 1920, men who had held the public 
spellbound with their words at the beginning of the War were, after the 
War was ended, unable to reach the public ear and joined the legions of 
disillusioned. The leaders of the Nonpartisan League must be counted 
among those who lost their place at the top. 
In North Dakota, often furiously cold in winter, two very warm 
pioneer populations from widely varied origins, but similar in hardiness 
and demand for freedom, proved the courage of immigrants and banded 
together to constitute a farmers 1 reform revolt unique, however brief, 
in American history. 
CHAPTER II 
THE ANTI-WAR POSITION OF THE NONPARTISAN LEAGUE 
LEADERSHIP A. C. TOWNLEY AND WILLIAM LEMKE 
In the second decade of the twentieth-century, North Dakota 
became the focal point of one of the most vigorous movements for reform 
occurring in American history. The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota 
was conceived and founded by Arthur C. Townley. It was his genius 
that provided the adaptation of parts of the many reform movements and 
made them seem remarkably well fitted to both the time and place. 
Throughout most of its active history the League was dominated by 
the personality and organizing ability of A. C. Townley, one of the great 
natural leaders of protest movements which this country has produced. 11 
Although Townley was never elected to an office, he commanded the 
respect of friend and foe as a political organizer. His ability as an orator 
was one of Townley's widely recognized and respected assets. Cam-
paigning throughout both Minnesota and North Dakota, Townley delivered 
fiery, controversial speeches to huge audiences wherever he went. 12 
The controversial nature of Townley's speeches and the emotional, 
attacking style were to create the atmosphere out of which violent 
12 
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anti~League tactics grew. As a speaker with a great deal of natural 
tale ht, Townley had acquired some education and training which, com-
bined with growing experience and strong emotional involvement in his 
work, gave him a unique command over his listeners. He quickly 
gained a reputation for his caustic attacks upon business interests, and 
huge ,crowds appeared to be entertained as well as informed.1 3 Accord-
ing to Alice C. Poehls, his greatest inventive asset was the emotional 
proof apparent in the arrangement, audience adaptation, language, and 
use of humor • 14 Because he spoke primarily to sympathetic farmers 
groups, Townley became more convincing as a result of demonstrating 
his understanding of their problems, his display of high moral character, 
and his real interest in those to whom he was speaking. 
As President of the Nonpartisan League, Townley was most often 
referred to by his detractors as "czar, 11 "dictator," and 11 autocrat. 11 
Though Townley shared the leadership of the League, and therefore its 
decision making, he did retain the predominant power in his own hands. 
Accordingly, questions about the organization's pos-ition on issues were 
ultimately considered to be his views. 
A. C. Townley as well as other leading figures within the League 
were and would remain opposed to war as a matter of principle even after 
the European conflict was over •. In a pamphlet entitled "How To Finance 
'?: 
The Great War, 11 published by the National Nonpartisan League in St. 
Paul, the position was stated as follows: 
) 
14 
War is ever the great calamity. The most righteous war is no 
exception. It is still a calamity that nations should have to 
suffer to get the rights that should flow freely to them merely 
because they are rights. 15 
This did not mean that the League was unwilling to support the country or 
the President. It fully agreed with the position that oppressive regimes 
might have to. be overturned. In the 11 Resolutions Adopted by the Non-
partisan League Conference, 11 a statement of the proceedings of the 
September 1917 conference, the resolutions stated: "We are involved in 
the most gigantic war of all history--a war for Democracy and Liberty 
against Autocracy and Slavery. 1116 For the Nonpartisan League, right 
had to demand that "the only justification for war is to establish and 
maintain human rights and interests the world over. For this reason we 
are opposed to waging war for annexation, either on our part or that of 
our allies. 1117 Being opposed to waging war for annexation on the part 
of other nations was considered to be proper in the nationalist thinking. 
Of course, when annexation was accomplished by the United States, or 
her allies, it was to establish and maintain human rights. Pecuniary 
interests were not a part of American involvement; to hint that they might 
be was un-American. 
Deeply rooted in an almost purely agricultural way of life, North 
Dakota was a land of immigrants. The two major groups, the Norwegians 
and the German-Russians, came in response to land-sale advertisement 
sponsored by railroads and grain-trade businesses. 18 Recognizing that 
) . 
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the maintenance of a steady flow of population into North Dakota country 
required the encouragement of immigration, the railroads created "Cham-
bers of Commerce 11 to advertise and sell land. 
The Norwegians came first and settled in the more fertile and rain 
abundant Red River Valley region located on the eastern edge of the state. 
The German-Russians came later and settled in the poorer lands to the 
west and frequently found that the advertisements had painted a more 
glowing picture than reality justified. 19 Both of these groups were, and 
have remained, fairly close-knit economic and social elements. This 
ethnicity provided an easy means of political appeal for the Nonpartisan 
League, a situation it quickly and efficiently capitalized into votes. Not 
only was the League platform designed to appeal to their group sentiment, 
but the use of Norwegian and German publications and the courting of 
local churches and priests added much to League success. 20 The 
appointment of William Lemke as second in command within the League 
provided a spokesman in the German language as well as a capable 
contact widely known and liked among the German-Russian population. 21 
Unlike most agrarian movements, the Nonpartisan League was not 
born during an era of great poverty and crises. The movement germinated 
from the idea that the corporate forces dominating the marketplace should 
and could be made to be responsive to the individual producers. The 
policies of the League were predicated on a belief that power should not 
only rest with the people _but that through the democratic process it 
16 
could be actively and directly wielded by these people to serve their own 
best interests. Robert L. Morlan, in his book Political Prairie Fire: The 
Nonpartisan League, 1915-1922, informs the reader that the League was 
" .. . . an organization proclaiming public ownership and control as a 
solution for economic ills, which was in time actually able to put its 
principles into practice on a statewide scale. 1122 The appeal to the 
farmer and to state pride was based on the principle that sources far 
removed from the actual labor of production should not reap great surplus 
profits through manipulation of economic and political processes, while 
those laboring to produce were left with meager return from their work 
and investment. 
The Nonpartisan League worked hard to gain control of North Dakota. 
Its organizers were trained by Townley to make full use of personal 
contact, and the buttonhole tactics were rewarded by spectacular 
success. 2 3 Not only was the League to control for some years the 
government of North Dakota, elect state officials and legislators in a 
number of midwestern and western states, and send several representa-
tives of the League to the United States Congress, but also it was to 
have lasting influence upon the destinies of many of the nation's voters 
and policies. 24 
The"" Nonpartisan League was one of the rarest of examples in 
American history of an attempt by agricultural sectors to correct the dis-
location produced by the .growth of political and economic dualism 
17 
brought forth by industrialization. The League was one of the most 
sweeping and least violent programs ever tried as a solution to the world 
of "haves and have nots. 11 The lack of violent tactics employed by the 
League was remarkable in light of the amount of violence and abuse 
eventually mustered against its members. 
Morlan states that it was owing to its proposals and the methods 
by which it operated, and the period in which it developed, that the 
League era was one of almost " .... unparalleled ill-feeling in those 
states in which it was a significant political force. 1125 The degree of 
emotion directed aga-inst the League may in part be traced to the non-
partisan nature of the organization. Townley's insight perceived that 
the control of party machinery was the result of the ability of individuals 
to control the legal structure dictating nominations and elections. 
Townley was able to grasp the full meaning of the party primary and the 
use to which it could be put to work against the parties. Townley 
explained the idea as follows: 
Inasmuch as the lack of respect for farmer rights could be 
laid to neither the Republican party nor the Democractic party 
exclusively, we hit upon the idea of us~ng a no-party or non-
partisan organization. 2 6 
This would allow both Democrats and Republicans who wanted to vote for 
certain principles of the League to become members without leaving their 
I 
traditional parties. The same reasoning was the foundation of the 
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decision to nominate candidates in the Republican primaries. Townley 
stated: 
~ .. the Republican farmers would have no feeling of leaving 
their own party whatever and Democratic farmers would not feel 
that they had deserted their party because they were trying to 
force their own men over in the Republican primary. 2 7 
On some occasions the League went beyond the primaries by throwing its 
support to Democratic or Socialist candidates. 
Despite gaining control of the Republican state chairmanship in 
1916, the League officials were emphatic in denying their affiliation 
with the Republican party.. In the Nonpartisan Leader, the official League 
publication, the following statement appeared: " •.. the League is NOT 
the Republican party. The League is not a movement WITHIN ANY PARTY. 
The League has nothing to do with old parties. 112 8 Of course, this risked 
alienation of some staunch Republican party members. 
The non-party position, the non-capitalist nature of the League pro-
grams, the high percentage of recent immigrants, and the previous third-
party affiliation of hired League personnel were certain to draw comments 
about the un-American character of the Nonpartisan League. One of the 
earliest aspersions labeled both the programs and the members of the 
League as Socialist. Socialism as a term in American history has been 
used so imprecisely that it can mean almost anything the listener wants 
to hear. ft was a fact that many of the personnel within the League had 
wo.rked for and held membership in Populist or Socialist organizations 
J. 
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and these organizations in capitalist United States were un-American. 
This tendency to use the term Socialist loosely makes it difficult to 
deal with these accusations even now. Robinson, in History of North 
Dakota, entitled the chapter on the Nonpartisan League as "The Great 
Socialist Experiment. 11 Then without attempting to explain his assess-
ment, Robinson labeled the party, its programs, its membership and 
the leaders as Socialist. 29 It is not surprising, therefore, that less 
professional writers would have used the same loose interpretation. 
Labor-management conflicts had long since made Socialist thinking the 
opposite of good American ideas. 
Many--including Robinson--were sincere in their feelings that 
much about the League was anti-American. It is equally evident that all 
manner of strategy was created to be used to discredit the League. One 
such circumstance was the State Library scandal. Larry Remele, in an 
article published in North Dakota History, has thoroughly examined the 
Library scandal issue and concluded that the incident grew out of purely 
*political machinations. 
The Independent Voters Association, .an association that was 
created to oppose the Nonpartisan League, had mounted a number of 
smear campaigns against the League on the basis of the League's being 
dominate4 by "bolshevistic" interests. 30 This particular move was in 
resp·onse to the creation of a Board of Administration as part of the 1919 
state government reorganization program. The viciousness of the 
20 
allegations was the result of the implications that the Nonpartisan 
League was trying to subvert American society by procuring indecent and 
un-American books for the public schools. Representative Olger B. 
Burtness, a foe of the Nonpartisan League, made the charges in the 1919 
session of the Legislature. The description given by Burtness to the 
legislative body characterized a book written by Ellen Key, Love and 
Ethics, as one that 
.... teaches your boy and your girl there is no holiness in 
marriage; that love and childgetting out of marriage are a 
glorious thing; that there is no such things as the sanctity 
of the home and of motherhood and fatherhood. 31 
Remele's article showed that the League was exonerated by an 
investigating committee and by Burtness' s own admission that he had not 
examined the books properly and that he had been guilty of poor select ion 
of words. This ended the public and legislative activities concerning the 
matter, but the damage that had touched the members of the League and 
the organization's reputation was not completely undone. The Independent 
Voters Association never ceased using the phrases 11 free love 11 and 
"bolshevik 11 to refer to members of the League, and the tendency spread 
to the news media. 
The clannish nature of the Norwegian and German-Russian popula-
tion that made up most of the League gave it the image of a group of 
"foreigners" to some others in the state. The impending war increased the 
21 
suspicion concerning their real beliefs. Robert P. Wilkins in 11 North 
Dakota and the European War, 11 stated: 
Deeply rooted ideological distrust of the financial and industrial 
capitalist classes by the German and Norwegian elements of the 
population which was greatly intensified by the exploitation of 
North Dakota producers, may be chiefly to account for the 
persistent opposition to policies that appeared to lead to war. 3Z 
This distrust on both sides of the question by the League members and 
non-League population was to remain a problem throughout the war. 
The growing possibility of the United States' becoming involved in 
the World War intensified the conflict between political factions either 
supporting neutrality or those who pushed for taking an active part in the 
battle. North Dakota was decidedly pacifistic in the early stages of the 
developing conflict in Europe, as were most other western states. There 
was, for a considerable period of time, as much sentiment for Germany 
as there was support for Britain. Whether or not the Nonpartisan League 
took its cue from national politics in the 1915-1916 campaign year, the 
League's position on the war issue was almost identical to that of 
Woodrow Wilson. There can be little doubt that Townley, other League 
leaders, and many of the rank and file were strongly against the United 
States' becoming involved in the war in any way. It was impossible for 
North Dakota farmers to connect the European affair to their needs or 
interests .. 
i"._. 
Prior to President Wilson's mes sage, delivered on the evening of 
April 2, 1917, in which he asked the Congress of the United States for a 
22 
declaration of war, it is dif~icult to find any evidence of an official war 
policy for the League. There is a paucity of pronouncement concerning 
the international situation in official League publications or speeches. 
Those statements that were made were discussions in a philosophic 
manner of the evils of war and plaudits for President Wilson's determina-
tion to stay neutral. This position was consistent with the League 
strategy. Any quest ion not directly related to the farmers' needs in 
North Dakota was viewed as irrelevant. Issues that were likely to 
introduce heated differences of opinion within the agricultural community 
were avoided, if at all possible. Herbert E. Gaston stated: 
The fact is that the League, up until the declaration of war 
by our government, had studiously and carefully refrained 
from any expression of opinion or policy on war and peace 
questions, the Allies or Germany. 33 
As long as it could, the League remained evasive on the war issue. 
The leaders of the Nonpartisan League sought to pursue with 
unusual dedication their own political program without allowing contro-
versial or devisive issues to claim their attention. Achieving reorgani-
zation of state government, freei!lg the farmer from control of monopolistic 
"Big Biz," and gaining financial aid and insurance programs were far more 
important in the League's infant stages. The problem. of European conflict 
was far away and none of the League member's concern. League leaders 
viewed as \heir primary purpose serving the interests of the members, 
who spent their energies upon the land in long hours of labor which left 
. 23 
scarce time for concern about world problems. Gaining programs upon 
which they had campaigned was not only a commitment but also a means 
of building up their own following. 
As the League success began to consolidate North Dakota member-
ship and the League-controlled legislature began enacting reform pro-
grams, the leadership of the organization began to become known. 
William Lemke was the most likely successor to Townley within 
the League administration. 34 On several occasions Townley was flatter-
ing in his praise of Lemke as the man upon whom he most depended 
within the League. At the first annual meeting of State Committeemen 
of the National Nonpartisan League in 1919, Townley introduced Lemke, 
who was one of the speakers. Townley stated: 
• ~ . Mr. Lemke has above all the men in this organization, 
served it MOST whole-heartedly, and efficiently. . . • I have 
in him absolute and complete confidence. And I hope that if 
anything should happen to me, that you first of all, for someone 
to lead this organization, will not neglect the counsel of this 
one man of the Northwest, that in his sacrifices to advance this-
cause, has proved in the last two years that he would DIE for it! 35 
As chairman of the Republican party, the League's attorney, and frequent 
trouble-shooter for Townley, Lemke was able to stay well informed about 
the overall activities of the League. Often, Lemke accepted the addi-
tional burden of assisting farmers who sought help for their legal 
problems. In his biography, Edward C. Blackorby points out that this 
was the basis for Lemke's devotion to the League. Blackorby states: 
11 
• • • more than anything else, Lemke needed to feel that he was 
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influential. 1136 Lemke gave so much time to the work of the Nonpartisan 
League that his income from legal practice was meager. His salary as 
an employee of the League was modest, and he appears to have been 
an easy mark for anyone who was "down on his luck. 11 This seems to be 
the way Lemke wanted to have things remain. Blackorby assures the 
reader that: 
Being at the center of power and influence and feeling that he 
was making progress toward the removal of society's ills were 
more satisfying rewards to Lemke than the larger fees he might 
have collected. Townley and the Nonpartisan League had 
made him a political factor in the state; a goal that had been 
Lemke's for a long time. 3 7 
William Lemke, unlike Townley, was unusually direct and succinct 
in his statements about his views. The prolific correspondence and later 
speeches indicated a bent for logical arrangement of his thoughts. He 
also seems to have been prone to be blunt and argumentative in asserting 
his opinions. This was a characteristic that also tended to create 
enemies among the opposition. 
That the position of the League on most matters was one with 
which he was in tacit agreement appears reasonable. Lemke's strategic 
position with the League indicates that the League placed great value on 
Lemke's abilities. His biographer stated: 
Lemke's secret for success lay largely in a tireless capacity 
for work and a drive that sustained him through eighteen-hour 
. days ;nbroken by the conviviality in which so many public 
figures find relaxation. 38 
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Among those who were familiar with the League and those who 
voted, certainly within North Dakota, Lemke was understood to be a 
power capable of moving the other leaders of the League. His vision and 
imagination, his capacity to dream great dreams, made Lemke the source 
of ideas for the League. 39 Carl Nelson, editor of The Cando Record and 
friend of Lemke, sent him a note in which he commented upon an item 
found in another newspaper. Nelson wrote: 11 To be called 'the brains of 
the Nonpartisan League' is not such an awful slam it seems to me. 1140 
Lemke seems to have been particularly popular with members of 
~ 
the farmer's movement, particularly the German population. A tremen:.... 
dous volume of letters to Lemke shows that people were convinced that 
he would help them if they asked. 
That Lemke carved out a seat of power within the League organi-
zation is demonstrated by the fact that he decided to stay with the 
League rather than make a bid for Congress upon the death of Henry T. 
Helgesen. Many letters of sympathy, several irate at the League, were 
written to Lemke when it became known that John M. Baer, the Non-
partisan Leader cartoonist, had been chos~n to receive League support 
in the race to fill the vacancy left by Helgesen. 41 
William Lemke was to become subject to the same general accusa-
tions from the Nonpartisan's opposition as were directed at other leaders. 
His German background made it almost inevitable that he would have 
been singled out as pro-German. His avowed position against England 
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added much fuel to the charges. Concerning his dedication to the pro-
gram of the League, there was no doubt. His loyalty sometimes became 
over-zealousness toward those people and causes he chose to back. 
When others were vacillating over the La Follette incident, Lemke never 
wavered in his staunch support of the Senator. 42 The La Follette inci-
dent is explained in Chapter V. It became the national press basis 
for branding the League pro-German and un-American. Such incidents 
made him an admirable friend but tended to provide propaganda for the 
opposition later in his career .. It was difficult at times to determine 
just when Lemke was being loyal and when he was acting out of 
stubbornness. 
Lemke campaigned tirelessly for Charles Evans Hughes in 1916, 
and could never quite accept Woodrow Wilson's election. He expressed 
the opinion after the election that he was sorry to know that the people 
of North Dakota did not know who that man Wilson was. In an answer 
to a letter he had received, he stated: 
.•. There are a whole lot worse things about Mr. Wilson 
than his Mexican policy. If t?e American people only knew 
the truth, he would never have gone to first base; but big 
business can even fool some of the farmers. 43 
In his mind Lemke never believed that Wilson had won the election in 
North Dakota. In a number of. letters and notes to friends he expressed 
the beliet that a recount would show the state for Hughes .. As chairman 
of the Republican party for the state he did not call for a recount, since 
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he knew it would not have changed the final outcome. However, Lemke 
waited for the election returns from California before conceding the race 
in the state. 44 
Although Lemke 1 s oppostion does not seem to have brought any 
severe reaction from President Wilson, there was some damage to Lemke 1 s 
future effectiveness in working with the administration. Blackorby 
described Lemke 1 s approach as "combative extremism 11 and felt that the 
natural alliance between the programs of the Nonpartisan League and the 
Democratic party after World War I was prevented by Lemke's persistent 
anti-British and anti-war attitude. This abrasiveness was to work 
against the best interests of both the League and Lemke on some very 
vital occasions. 
Although his correspondence indicates that Lemke urged others to 
be cautious with their statements if they appeared too harsh for the 
welfare of the League, he was subject to extremes that denied him the 
moderation that might have saved the Nonpartisan League many of its 
most discrediting indictments. 45 
William Lemke was characterized as a very capable campaigner 
and highly motivated speaker. That his speeches did not bring the 
troubles to him that befell others can be attributed to the amount of time 
he spent in behind-the-scene work, to his traveling primarily within 
North Dakota, and to the fact that he was recognized throughout the 
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area as a very capable defense attorney. Nevertheless, there were times 
when he endured much abuse. 
The fact that he was German made it increasingly difficult for him 
to express his views without receiving abuse related to his ethnic 
origins. After 1916, his intensive support of Hughes and strong cam-
paigning in the communities of German people heightened suspicions 
about him. Lemke recognized the danger to himself. His primary con-
cern, however, was in connection with his effectiveness as a campaigner. 
He was aware of the adverse effects of attacking too strongly and tried to 
modify his own views. Blackerby states: "He found it easier to feel and 
express loyalty to the United States than to convince others that he was 
loyal. A 6 As the principal legal counsel for the League, he was to come 
in for an abundant share of newspaper criticism and defamation. 
Lem.ke was, as were most leaders of the movement, strongly anti-
war as long as there seemed any possibility of the nation's avoiding the 
conflict. He believed that all wars were caused by a very few for their 
own enrichment. Most of the leaders of the Nonpartisan League were 
both anti-imperialists and Anglophobes. 47 Lemke expressed these con-· 
victions over and over in his correspondence to other members of the 
League. Blackerby stated: "Not only at this time but through the period 
of World War II, he believed that the stronghold of those who start and 
ruh all wars was in the British Isles and France. 1148 
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From the beginning of World War L Lemke felt that Wilson had 
acceded to the British sea policy in a manner that was not neutral and 
that his actions would lead to conflict. In the early stages of the 
European dispute he was unquestionably more sympathetic toward 
Germany. 49 Lemke's stubbornness was displayed in some attitudes, 
his undying dislike for all things British was the motive for Lemke's 
blaming the loss of certain counties of North Dakota in the 1916 election. 
Lemke claimed that those counties had been influenced by Canadians, by 
which he implied influence on behalf of Eng land. 
Blackorby stated: 
While Lemke may have held the rural and German-American 
vote for Hughes, he probably lost votes elsewhere by his . 
vicious attacks on Wilson. His attacks on the President's 
record as one of crime and murder were offensive to some. SO 
The tone, the sarcasm, and the choice of words used by the leaders of 
the League in their speeches were so slanderous in nature that they gave 
the impression that the speakers were more against the government than 
against the war. The people listening to the speeches heard the tone 
and the words and did not always know the unspoken feelings that made 
it possible for Townley and Lemke to be loyal to the people and the 
nation, while still abhorring the attendant abuses and corruptions that 
are always a part of war. 
That the Nonpartisan League leadership was responsible for state-
ments, both written and spoken, that put them in a position of opposition 
) 
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to the war cannot be ignored. That the next six years would make that 
position so frequently dangerous they may not have understood. 
CHAPTER III 
NONPARTISAN LEAGUE ATTACKS ON "WAR 
PROFITEERS" AND 11 BIG BIZ" 
As North Dakota prepared for statehood amid machinations for the 
site of the state capital, deals for the major educational institutions, 
and railroad tactics to prevent statehood, one man was moving into a 
dominant position of power. Alexander McKenzie, who allied himself 
with newspapers, the Northern Pacific Railroad, and powerful business 
interests of Minneapolis and St. Paul, worked with these interest groups 
to establish virtual colonial power over North Dakota. 
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McKenzie was 
·to remain the "Boss" of North Dakota until the rise of the Nonpartisan 
League. This boss of political and economic affairs who worked for 
busines~ interests from outside the state was the very essence of what 
the League wanted to wipe away. 5 2 
The Nonpartisan Leag~e was born and grew up as the people's 
means of combating these interests, which in League parlance were 
called "Big Biz. 11 League strategy was to maintain a ·barrage of constant 
attacks against this foe. The foe, however, was never very clearly 




In speeches and through the Nonpartisan League..:.owned newspaper, the 
Leader, League spokesmen began the practice of designating all opposi-
tion by vague terms such as "McKenzie ring," "Old gang, 11 and "Big 
Biz. 1153 It appears that members of the League, and its leaders, had no 
exact roster of the enemy. Circumstances occasionally dictated that 
anyone not supporting the League on all issues be classed among the 
opposition. These very careless and imprecise designations eventually 
alienated groups and individuals, and cost the League much support from 
those who had no quarrel with the farmers' programs. 54 On those 
occasions when more precise interests were pointed out, those named 
included subsidized newspapers, old guard politicians, industrial 
manufacturers, bankers, insurance concerns, railroads, utilities, 
millers, and buyers of grain. Specific examples were even more rare, 
but might include such names as the Fargo Forum, the Grand Forks 
Herald, and the Minneapolis Chamber of Commerce. 
The Nonpartisan Leader quickly established itself as a potent 
weapon for both offense and defense. Since each membership in the 
League carried an automatic subscription to the Leader, it soon had one 
of the largest circulations in the state. It was a rather well edited, 
folksy publication carrying general news and items of interest to the 
farmer. The Leader provided such services as a women's page and 
notices of all meetings held that were to be conducted in the German 
language. On the farm woman 1 s page, attempts at gaining support were 
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found in such items as: 11 Patriotism, Politics, Chivalry and Women. 
These four have been in the foreground of discussion for some years and 
have formed the basis of many lectures and papers pertaining to woman 
suffrage. 1155 Suffrage, like the war, was a controversial issue; and the 
League was willing to appeal to women for their votes, but not at the 
expense of losing others. The Leader also served as a direct contact 
between the central organization and the members, and was " . . . a 
means by which the leaders might guide the actions of the members, and 
a method of combating the tide of bitter opposition which almost instantly 
arose. 1156 The editorials· were vigilant about responding to charges made 
by the opposition, and each issue set out.League principles and programs. 
An example of the use of the newspaper to defend League practices while 
publicizing its views is found in the following case of the membership 
fee for the League. The Leader item stated: 
Nobody raised particular H __ because of the many and varied 
interests, but as soon as the damphool farmer effectively 
organized what a whooping howl goes up from all who so dearly 
love the farmer. What wonder and worry over those $ 6 or $ 9 
contributions for membership and campaign fund. Has the 
farmer not the right to spend $9 of his own money without it 
being any other person's business? 5 7 
The editor went further to point out that people within the state had con-
tributed to party political funds in the past and it was uo. K. ! ! " "Why 
was it now wrong? 1158 
The fact that neither the Leader nor the League itself ever made a 
distinction between the Republican McKenzie ring and the Progressives 
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greatly galled the Progressives. 59 The League could see no real differ-
ence in the platforms of the two parties, and considered both to be 
unsatisfactory. This attitude created enemies of dedicated party mem-
bers and other newspapers. The League sweepingly condemned non-
supportive newspapers as the kept press, and added insult by instituting 
the appointment of official county newspapers to carry government news. 
This practice was an economic threat to many publications, especially 
those in the smaller towns. 
The press and leadership of the opposition did not attempt to deny 
the existence of evils that the Nonpartisan League- addressed, nor did 
they remedy the situations. They responded by attacking League per-
sonalities and programs. 
From its inception the League had followed the strategy of attack-
ing members of the opposition in positions of political and economic 
power by portraying them as adversaries of the good, honest, simple way 
of life. Such tactics of humiliation and character assassination were 
reinforced by proclamations by the leaders of the League. It was inevit-
able that many of those threatened with displacement by League ascen-
dancy and accusation would be deeply antagonistic toward the League. 60 
Newspapers, bankers, industrialists, and other parties began to use 
their power and wealth to stem the growing danger to their s~ations in 
society. The fight between the Nonpartisan League and its· opposition 
was intrinsically a political battle. 
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The threat to business interests was greatly heightened when 
League representatives attended the Trades and Labor Assembly of Fargo 
in April 1916. Organized labor in North Dakota which had been of minor 
importance in the political affairs of the state, became more significant 
later that month when it endorsed the League program and all its 
candidates. 61 Nonpartisan League attacks on business were also 
receiving support from the United States Secretary of Labor. Secretary 
William B. Wilson was quoted .in a column of the Leader, reprinted from 
an Atlantic City newspaper,. as referring to the 11 unpatriotic profiteering 
of businessmen. 11 62 The Secretary wa.s quoted as saying in a speech 
given to the United States Chamber of Commerce: 
... I now tell you business men, it is no time to stand on your 
prejudices and insist on abnormal profits. If you could not 
collect such profits in peace times, you should not take advan-
tage of the crisis of your country in times of war. . . . Labor 
has been restless because the word has gone forth that iron and 
steel manufacturers are making from two hundred to four hundred 
per cent profits and shipping and mining companies are making 
enormous profits. 63 
This was the very thing that the leaders of the League had been saying in 
North Dakota. Now the League and labor were joining forces to find 
solutions to their common problems. Morlan states concerning labor and 
the farmer in North Dakota that the meeting in that year may have been 
11 
.... of small significance .. c in North Dakota, but the later to be 
famous fafmer-labor alliance had had its beginning. 1164 
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As President of the Nonpartisan League, Townley was ofter referred 
to by his detractors as "czar," "dictator," and "autocrat. 11 These terms 
were more universally used to describe the titans of trusts and monopolies. 
Townley disliked being cast in the same mold with business giants. 
Though Townley shared the leadership of the League, and therefore its 
decision making, he did retain ultimate power in his own hands. Accord-
ingly, the organization's stand on issues was ultimately to be considered 
his views. 65 
It is noticeable that the Nonpartisan League contained an· unusual 
number of remarkable speakers and ca_mpaigners. In the art of persuasion 
.and mass psychology certain League speakers were second to none. 66 
Alice C. Poehls examined the speaking style of Townley, and stated: 
Townley demonstrated an ability to adapt to his audience by 
adjusting his tone, his arrangement and his evidential materials 
to the particular group .... Townley considered the drives and 
motives of his audience in terms of their emotional needs .... 
Townley motivated his audiences primarily through the activation 
of their safety needs, love needs, and needs for prestige. . .. 
[He] used patriotism, fear, and social power as emotional appeals 
in most of his addresses. 6? 
Townley made most effective use of these techniques in arousing 
strong emotion and fear within his listeners concerning freedom--
particularly of speech and assembly. The opposition's harrassment, 
that very early became a factor at nearly every League meeting, worked 
to. Townley's advantage as a dynamic speaker. He and others of the 
League were masters in the use of humor, satire, and ridicule. Townley 
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consistently linked his opponents with undemocratic processes, 
unethical economic practices, licentiousness, and disloyalty. 
The potent, emotional language of the League speakers provided 
the ammunition of counterattack used against the League. The opposition 
had long used mud-slinging campaign tactics of its own, both on the 
speakers' platforms and in the press, and soon, as a result of the 
changing status of the country relative to the war, had new charges to 
level against League leaders .. However distorted the use of Townley's 
speeches and League publications may have been, they were the source 
of statements used against the League after 1916. 
It was quite natural during a war that League speakers would 
address themselves to the fears of the families of soldiers. Townley 
and many other League speakers played upon the emotions of love, 
anxiety, and loneliness for absent family members who were away in the 
service. Townley was not above using maudlin drama: 
While your boys are across the water, fighting for liberty and 
democracy, over there in the night some times there travel 
among the bodies of the dead, some very low-down degraded 
creatures in human form. They follow all war. They go among 
the dead bodies of the soldiers, robbing the little things upon 
their bodies--money, treasures, clothing, and the little 
trinkets that might have been sent from home. 68 
These statements, were calculated to elicit feelings of bitterness toward 
those responsible for this absence. It was obvious that Germany's 
government was greatly responsible for the fighting, but League speakers 
were intent upon showing. that there were additional culprits accountable 
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and that they were influencing and directing national activities in 
America. These forces responsible as the underlying cause of conflict 
were manipulators of wealth in all countries, including the United States. 
They were the old and often identified enemies of the League: bankers 
and industrialists who stood to gain from others doing their fighting for 
them--in short, "Big Biz." 
Townley told his listeners where the burden for supporting the war 
was carried. "Since the war began you will find the farmer's wives and 
daughters • o e out in the field pi.eking corn I digging Up the potatoes I 
. 
gathering in the food tb feed the world and its armies of liberty. 1169 
These were merely examples of the injustices. League speakers 
went on to reveal the real venality which was to be found in those who 
reaped benefit from such misfortune. The vested interests to be held 
accountable were pointed out: 
When the government conscripted your boys, it didn't conscript 
wealth, if it had, we shouldn't have to have wheatless days 
and meatless days and heatless days .... You farmers are 
trying to produce more crops than ever before, you have had to 
subscribe to the Liberty Loan, the Red Cross and Y.M.C.A. 
and on top of all that they now take your boys . • • . Rival 
groups of monopolists are playing a dea.dly game for commercial 
supremacy ..•. The con tributary causes of the present war 
are various; but above horrible slaughter loom the ugly incitings 
of an economic system based upon exploitation .... l'he pinch 
of want is even now felt by millions of our people, not because 
of the scarcity of things needed to support life in comfort, but 
becau~e of extortionate prices foisted upon us by speculators 
and g~inblers. 7o 
J 
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Shortly after the declaration of war by Congress, Nonpartisan 
leaders traveled to the nation's capital to make their views about fair 
practices known to President Wilson and the administration. League 
leaders urged universal application of price controls on all basic con-
sumer goods to prevent excessive profits and skyrocketing costs of farm 
machinery. These leaders came away from Washington feeling that they 
had gained the President's promise of fair and equal treatment for both 
agricultural and industrial producers. The League leaders, following the 
Presidential visit, reported that they supported Wilson. Their state-
ments concerning "Big Biz" were almost identical to those of Secretary 
of Labor Wilson. A League pamphlet, "War Progr~m and Statement of 
Principles, 11 stated: 
We are unalterably opposed to permitting stockholders of private 
corporations ~o pocket these enormous profits, while at the same 
time a species of coercion is encouraged toward already poorly 
paid employees of both sexes, in urging them to purchase 
government bonds to help finance the war. Patriotism demands 
service from all according to their capacity. To conscript men 
and exempt the blood-stained wealth coined from the sufferings_ 
of humanity is repugnant to the spirit of America and contrary to 
the ideals of democracy. 7 1 
When, as the war progressed, price controls were placed upon 
selected natural resources and agricultural commodities, while consumer 
prices and costs of farm equiprnent were allowed to rise, the members of 
the League became disenchanted with President Wilson's administration. 
The price of wheat was limited to approximately two dollars per bushel, 
but cotton was allowed to seek its highest mark, as were steel and 
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coal. Midwesterners, and Nonpartisan members ih particular, came to 
feel that they had been sold out by the President to industrial interests 
within the United States and Britain. 72 The League returned to its more 
caustic attacks on the enemy, because now the robbers of dead soldiers, 
the plunderers of the nation, were establishing themselves as patriots. 
League speakers were intent upon unmasking these abusers: 
Nothing that I could imagine, up to a little while ago, is as 
bad as robbing the dead body of a soldier boy ..•• But while 
that is going on over there, here in this country are a group of 
citizens who have talked so much about themselves that we 
regard them almost as patriots, who go about among us, fat, 
well kept, well groomed, who with their million ramifications 
throughout this nation~, rob and plunder the mothers and 
brothers and sisters of those boys who have gone across to 
fight for liberty and democracy. 73 
In addresses delivered by League leaders, there now appeared 
such phrases as, "Their patriotism is the kind that requires war profits 
to make it work, 11 and, 11 If it is right to conscript the lives of our boys 
it is right to conscript the steel. 117 4 These were especially bitter and 
threatening words to men of economic and political power and great self-
esteem--men who also knew the power of words. But words alone, even 
when spoken by Townley in his impelling manner, hardly seem to provide 
adequate explanation for the brutal reprisals of the opposition which 
included mob violence and near fatal abuse of League members. 7 5 The 
United States was at war and the mood was changing in the country. It 
was not just the words of League leaders that seemed to pose a threat; 
these same leaders represented a dynamic, powerful, and rapidly 
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expanding political movement that was building the weapon that would be 
used to curtail the power and prestige of long-standing enterprises. 
Townley's speeches, and even more so his organization of the Non-
partisan League, were far too skillful and far too much of a threat to be 
ignored. Frustration at League power and perhaps some guilt on the part 
of those named the opposition demanded retaliation of a forceful nature. 
CHAPTER IV 
NONPARTISAN LEAGUE SUPPORT FOR THE WAR EFFORT 
In December 1917, President Woodrow Wilson, in his "State of the 
Union 11 mes sage, informed the nation that there were those within the 
country whom he described as disloyal: creatures of passion and 
anarchy. They were, the President said, attempting to involve the 
United States in the European War. Continuing the message, he stated: 
There are some men among us and many residents abroad who, 
though born and bred in the United States and calling them-
selves Americans, have so forgotten themselves and their 
honor as citizens as to put their passion and sympathy with 
one or the other side in the great European conflict above 
their regard for the peace and dignity of the United States. 76 
The President called upon Americans to oppose war and called such an 
attitude 11thoughtfully patriotic Americanism." 
As circumstances drew President Wilson closer to the view that 
America's entrance into war on behalf of Eng land was imminent, the 
leadership of the League would find it more uncomfortable to support the 
government's position. Nevertheless, owing to the President's adoption 
of the position that the United States was going to war to 11 make the world 
safe for democracy" in its struggle with the autocracy of i~perialistic 




The speeches of the League leaders would from this time forward 
reflect a strong backing of the "people" of the "country 11 and more 
especially of "the boys at the front. 11 The League had been supporting 
the people of North Dakota, and their boys, while opposing the privilege 
and abuse it saw in the business and government of the state. This was 
to be the posit ion of the League toward the national government and 
World War I. Blackorby stated concerning Lemke: 
Now that his native country was involved in the war, Lemke 
wanted to see her victorious over Germany. But at the same 
time, by all the powers vested in him, he was det'ermined to 
see that the President would run the war so that there would 
be no advantage accruing to Engla~d from it. 77 
Lemke believed, apparently throughout his life, that the stronghold of 
those who started and ran all wars was in France and Brita in. He was 
determined, as was Townley, that through the North Dakota Congress-
man, John M. Baer, the President should be pressured into developing 
measures that would benefit neither millionaires, bankers, nor 
industrialists. 
The wave of early League successes in North Dakota had seemed 
to draw the League into expansion and nec.essitate its becoming a 
national movement. Poehls stated that at the time of the capture of the 
government in North Dakota, Townley had not included within his plans 
for the Nonpartisan League anything beyond the state. 78 
With their option to expand, the necessity of combating adver-
saries of a national charq.cter, and the importance of agricultural staples 
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to the country militarily, demanded that the leadership of the League 
divide their efforts between North Dakota and other areas of the country. 
Any question that involved the we.Hare and economy of the country 
involved agriculture, and any question that involved the farmers of 
America involved the League. Becoming a national movement forced the 
League to take an official position regarding the war. The decision of 
the leaders was consistent with the other doctrines of their program. 
The first published statement of the League's position was issued after 
the Minneapolis and St. Paul National Nonpartisan League Conference 
held in September of 1917. 79 The rapidity with which the Nonpartisan 
League was swept into national affairs was used by critics of the League 
to show that the League really never understood the importance and 
complexity of certain issues connected with American entry into the war. 
Defenders of the League pointed out that the secrecy and indecision that 
was characteristic of the Wilson government prevented any awareness 
until after the final declaration. SO 
The Nonpartisan government in North Dakota did not want a war, 
but when the United States entered the conflict it would support the 
"boys at the front 11 as few other states were willing to do. Newspapers 
throughout the .state began to report with pride on the preparations being 
undertakell: under the new military act passed by Congress and put into 
effect July 1, 1916. North Dakota's National Guard had been sent with 
General Pershing in an effort to police the Mexican border. After their 
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return they were soon placed under direct federal control in accordance 
with the new act. This· unit would be in the first wave to leave for 
duty. 81 The Grand Forks Herald in September 1917 reported the "rousing 
send-offu afforded the second draft of the national army leaving for Camp 
Dodge. The following Monday two regitnents of the North Dakota National 
Guard were to leave for training camp. The boys were going to the front. 
North Dakota was to outstrip in per capita effort most other states 
in Liberty Loan contributions, Red Cross drives, and Y. M. C .A. sub-
script ions. The farmers, with the aid of their Nonpartisan movement, 
increased their crop output in spite o:t: climatic adversities. The military 
units sent from the state were more fully equipped than those of most 
states, thus saving the federal government much expense. 82 As early as 
1917 the League platform included a proposal for $2 5 . 0 0 p~r month bonus 
to veterans and a one year moratorium on their debts. 83 The state 1 s pro-
vision for debt relief and loan assistance during and after military service 
was consistent with League belief in just economic reward for those who 
served. The war record of North Dakota, the only state with a Non-
partisan administration, was very sound. 
It defies reason to explain why a government that supported the 
war effort of its country so well was to have been constantly confronted 
with accusations of trying to jeopardize that country. 
'?': 
The speakers of the Nonpartisan League did not call a truce in their 
drive to find some means ·of forcing a more equitable sharing of the cost 
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of war. Townley still tore into the opposition with speeches upon the 
needs of the people in wartime. In an address given at Jamestown in 
June of 1917, he stated: 
This country can never succeed in war until it governs the busi-
ness of transporting your products. . . . In a time like this . . . 
all the liberties that your forefathers and mine fought for and won 
are in jeopardy ... ~ I am not talking this way to discourage 
you in financing this war, but to impress on you the necessity 
of financing it in a tremendous measure or keep your boys at 
home, because they should not go there without money only to 
starve. 84 
Disloyalty in the League's way of thinking was in the existing system of 
inequality, not among those who supported their boys in the war even 
while abhorring circumstances of the conflict. 
The principles of self-determinism, open negotiations, freedom 
from controlled transportation and travel, removal of economic barriers, 
reduction of munitions making, anti-colonialism, and guarantees of 
territorial integrity can be found throughout the League resolutions and 
statements of principles. 85 These principles were the foundation of 
League leaders' efforts to coerce President Wilson into laying down the 
terms of victory. The League hoped to prevent imperialists and despoilers 
from benefiting after a victor end to the war. They seem to have feared -
European powers and wanted the whole country to support the war to a 
greater extent. 
Thei-:closeness of the ideqls of the League and those expressed by 
President Wilson encouraged the League. The most satisfying effort of 
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Lemke to influence the national government was a petition demanding 
terms of victory. The 11 Fourteen Point Program 11 of President Wilson was 
an indication that Lemke's determination for asserting League principles 
was not without merit. According to Congressman Baer: 
The points listed in the petition appeq,led to the President's 
idealism, [and in Baer's opinion,] President Wilson saw in 
them an instrument with which he could aa6eal to the popu-
lations of Germany and Austria-Hungary. . 
It was the opinion of Representative Baer that the petition was 
instrumental in motivating the President to issue the Fourteen Points. 
Baer felt that, since ten of the fourteen principles .were similar in detail 
to those on Lemke's petition, it was probable that one of the best known 
documents of the twentieth-century was in "language and sense 11 partly 
the work of William Lemke. 8 7 
The Nonpartisan League believed that normally men are judged by 
their ability to produce, but that in War they are ranked according to 
their ability to destroy. The League hoped that its efforts, and tho_se of 
North Dakota, in support of the war could prevent destruction beyond the 
havoc of the fighting. 
North Dakota and the League did give their full support and aid to 
the men serving in the military throughout World War .I. They went 
beyond most states in supplying their share of men,. crops, and economic 
protection''bf those away from their homes. The government of the United 
States greatly praised North Dakota 1 s contributions. The League 
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continued to demand equalized assessment of industry, conscription of 
wealth, and assurance against acquisition of territory. 
The League was pleased with the terms for victory as proposed in 
the "Fourteen Points 11 of President Woodrow Wilson. 
CHAPTER V 
DISLOYALTY CHARGES IN MINNESOTA AND 
THE TOWNLEY-GILBERT TRIAL 
By 1918 the League was active in thirteen states and a threat to 
those accustomed to govern. The months of terrorism against the League 
in these states after 1917 comprise· a period in American history difficult 
to assess. The League li.ad always maintained that there was a con-
spiracy arrayed against it, of those who had been in political control 
and were turned out by the League, those who feared the economic pro-
grams that opposed monopoly, and those ultra-conservative organiza-
tions that wished to maintain the status-quo which they had professed 
to be sacred. Particularly vocal and active among the conservative, 
nationalistic, and reactionary elements were the Public Safety Com-
missions, the Independent Voters Association, the Loyal Voters Associ-
ation, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, The Sound Government 
League, and the Public Defense Councils. Whether conspiring to defeat 
the League or not, these groups did comprise a vendetta assemblage. 
Morlan informs us that it was scarcely deniable that many high 
officials, persons in posit ions of economic power, and numerous 
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newspaper editors either feared or hated the League because they were 
part of the p~litical and economic factions the League had attacked. 88 
This does not completely explain, however, the amount of crowd and 
mob brutalities. 
Each side was sweeping in its accusations and imprudent in its 
use of words to describe the other's principles and personalities. 
Beyond the uses of rhetoric and caustic newsprint, the opposition to the 
League increasingly availed itself of methods that were physically as 
well as civilly abusive. Mobbings, beatings, tarring and featherings, 
jailings, and injunctions against the League were applauded, if not 
backed, by entrenched political and economic groups. Concerning the 
unusual amount of terrorism, Russell stated: 
There is no doubt that agents were sent out from St. Paul and 
Minneapolis in advance to stage some of these riots, and 
little question that the enginery of the state was in some 
instances, . . . deliberately employed on the same side. 
One speaker was mobbed for reading to an audience extracts 
from President Wilson's The New Freedom; others were mobbed 
for reading the Bible. Wherever it was known that the League 
was almost ready to establish a branch the efforts were 
redoubled to ca use some outbreak or breach of the peace that 
could be used to the advantage of the milling and elevator 
interests. 89 · 
Seeing the League as a dangerous threat to property and privilege which 
they reverenced, these groups felt strongly justified in availing them-
selves of any method to rid the nation of "unpatriotic 11 forces. go 
Tweton and Jelliff wrote: 
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The loyalty issue was a handy and potent weapon against a 
· political opponent who had the popular side of an argument, 
and the lengths to whiCh this opposition and a fanatical brand 
of "patriotism 11 were carried constitutes a sordid chapter in 
the history of Minnesota. 9 1 
It was in Minnesota, rather than North Dakota, the stronghold of 
Nonpartisan membership, that the organizers and speakers of the League 
experienced the most virulent charges and attacks upon their loyalty to 
the United States. Minnesota was also, of course, the nearest center of 
11 Big Biz. 11 Attorneys long on ambition and short on integrity seemed to be 
in great supply, and law enforcement officials were prone to view 
violence as natural if it aided the traditional political structure to which 
they owed their positions. Such were the times, that these attitudes 
toward law and order served to foster more intense turmoil and encouraged 
more extreme action within crowds. 
The anti-League news media provided an ample and continuous 
supply of rumor upon which the opposition could act. The Grand Forks 
Herald, The Fargo Independent, The Courier News, the Twin City news-
papers, and the America First magazine formed the nucleus from which 
many opposition publications took their cu~. 92 . Nationally syndicated 
columnists picked up and disseminated the items found in these papers. 
This resulted in considerable damage to the reputation of the League and 
North Dakota throughout the United States a The reporting of these news 
sources ranged from misunderstanding to misquoting and falsification. 
Editorials and reporting were regularly so slanted that the text of 
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speeches and the facts of many League statements and activities were 
distorted beyond recognition. Lemke, Townley, and other leaders of the 
League were so consistently "mistakenly quoted" that they had to hire 
stenographers to record their speeches in order to have an accurate 
record of their words. 93 Even recorders did not prove to be sufficient 
in court or when officials chose to ignore the facts. 
The power of the press was most notable when Townley and others 
were indicted for disloyalty and sedition. Anti-League news coverage 
without hesitation pronounced guilt and tried cases before the courts 
convened. 94 . Such reporting by the "kept press 11 was perhaps the most 
damaging of all the tactics to the League as a political movement. 
One incident of error by the press in reporting a speech made at the 
St. Paul Producers' and Consumers 1 Conference in September 1917 demon-
strates the fatal power of the press. Senator Robert M. La Follette was 
scheduled to be the last speaker at the conference. Lemke and other 
League leaders, fearing a press over-anxious to find something treason-
ous, convinced La Follette to set aside his prepared speech and talk 
extemporaneously. In an exchange with a heckler, La Follette stated: 
"We had a grievance against Germany. 11 This was carried in the Associ-
ated Press as: "We had no grievance against Germany. 1195 This news 
item was picked up by newspapers all over the country and cited as 
:>':'.. 
evidence that the League supported disloyalty. Many of the League 
leaders felt that this incident played a major part in the growing 
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repudiation of the League and its leadership. It was many months later 
that the Associated Press admitted that the inclusion of the word "no" 
had been a mistake. 9 6 By this time, however, the damage to the League 
and the advantage for the opposition was an accomplished fact. 
It was from this same convention that the National Nonpartisan War . 
Program and Statement of Principles was issued; this pamphlet served as 
the basis for the sedition charges which were lodged against Townley 
and Joseph Gilbert, who was a. hired organizer for the Nonpartisan League. 
It was also at this convention that Townley made the speech that would 
be the primary source for evidence that was used by the prosecution in 
his disloyalty trial in Jackson, Minnesota. 
Some of the most frequently misquoted and intentionally perverted 
examples from Townley's speeches can only lead to the conclusion that 
there was little or no real basis for charges of sedition in Minnesota. 
The essential tone and style of the Townley approach is demonstrated by 
the following: 
All young men who are on the farms ought to be left on the farms 
to raise crops and not taken into the army .... the boys 
shouldn't be taken into the army, they are better off where they 
are than in the trenches five thousand miles away. . . . why 
the millions of American manhood sacrificed upon the bloody field 
of war? ... It is equally unjust to permit lobbyists to oppose 
the conscription of wealth without let or hinderance, while making 
it a crime for a mother to oppose the conscription of the life of 
her son. 97 
The subject matter, the tone of assertion, and the words them-
selves did not constitute .reasonable grounds for either sedition or 
l . 
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disloyalty charges. It must be added also that, without fiery polemics, 
Townley and other League ·speakers could not have hoped to retain an 
audience for the great length of some of their speeches. It was not the 
orations and publications frequently used to attack the League that were 
the truly offensive elements so hated by the opposition. The real 
essence of Nonpartisanism that rankled the opposition was the strategy 
of casting business, press, and old guard politicians as murderers and 
exploiters. 
Local officials and other opponents of the League instigated 
charges against several of the organization's leaders and workers at one 
time or another. Most of these charges were never followed through to 
the extent of coming to trial. They were a tactic used to prevent Non-
partisan speeches and organizing activities. The most notable case of 
trumped-up accusations being pushed through the court was the Townley-
Gilbert trial. This was the event that would be used with continuing 
effect to discredit both the League and its leadership. 
Gilbert had been arrested on other occasions. In fact, many 
League organizers and speakers had been arrested frequently on bogus 
charges before they could reach the places they were to speak. This 
practice was especially well employed in Minnesota, where militant 
efforts to prevent the farmers from assembling and hearing speeches 
were well coordinated. 
) 
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The arrest of A. C. Townley on charges of e-mploying Gilbert was 
based upon Gilbert's distribution of the "War Program 11 pamphlet and 
upon speeches Gilbert had made on those occasions. The prosecution 
based its case on the allegedly seditious statements in these pamphlets 
and upon Townley's speech. The actual legal charge, however, was 
conspiracy. This was made necessary because in spite of the fact that 
the pamphlet had in an earlier case in Martin County, Minnesota, been 
found seditious the decision had been overturned by the State Supreme 
Court. The State Supreme Court ruling stated: 
The resolutions, taken as a whole appear to be nothing more 
serious than a rhetorical and somewhat flamboyant platform on 
which a certain class of citizens are s_olicited to join an organi-
zation whose avowed purpose is the amelioration of alleged 
evils of present economic conditions. 98 
Morlan has characterized County Attorney Albert R. Allen of Martin 
County and County Attorney E. H. Nichols of Jackson County, who 
prosecuted the cases against the pamphlet and against Gilbert and 
Townley, as two of the state 1 s most vehement 11 super-patriots"; they 
were almost fanatical opponents of the Nonpartisan League, often 
becoming deranged in their speech when it concerned the League. 99 
In the trial at Jackson County, the charges were conspiring to 
teaqh against enlistment. The prosecution based its case almost 
entirely upon the testimony of Ferdinand Teigen, a former League 
organizer who was dismissed from the League for dishonesty, and whose 
testimony was repeatedly shown to be untruthful. Judge Dean, the 
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presiding judge, would not allow the defense attorneys to conduct their 
case to prove that Townley and Gilbert were widely recognized loyal 
citizens. He charged that they must confine their defense to proving 
that they were not disloyal. lOO This prevented the introduction of a letter 
from President Wilson personally thanking Townley for his patriotic 
cooperation. There were similar letters from George Creel of the United 
States Justice Department, and a multitude of letters, speeches, and 
editorials from Townley's own Nonpartisan activities which urged support 
for the war. lO 1 Judge Dean defined for the court and again for the jury 
the interpretation that would be placed upon the term conspiracy. The 
term was defined to mean that any two or more persons jointly acting 
toward the same end could form a conspiracy. They did not have to be 
acting in an organized or concerted way. One conspirator did no.t have 
to be directly aware of the other's doings. They did not have to carry 
the act through to its conclusion, and circumstantial evidence was 
sufficient for guilt. Conviction did not require proof of personal contact 
or planning. 
The trial which convicted Townley and Gilbert was a travesty 
against justice and a farce of legal procedure. It was not a Federal 
statute they were tried for violating; it was a state law passed by the 
Minnesota Legislature after the Nonpartisan League began to make head-
way. at organizing the state. lOZ On July 14, 1919, the Grand Forks 




Minnesota has in its midst both the witch-burner and the 
inquisition. 
A. C. Townley, president of the National Nonpartisan League, 
is found guilty. And with him, Joseph Gilbert, one of his 
lieutenants. 
No sour and solemn gathering of the town elders in Old 
Salem ever perpetrated such a monstrous judgment in the 
name of justice and law upon a magic worker. 
• . . For Townley's "crime 11 is not disloyalty, but magic 
working arid political heresy. 103 
Although the war was over before Townley was convicted and served 
his sentence, the charges were made near the end of the terrible conflict, 
and the damage accomplished by the charges could not be erased. 
Hatreds and passions of war do not evaporate with the signing of a cease 
fire. Long after this, opposition forces frequently used copies or state-
ments about the conviction in the press and from the podium while 
pointedly ignoring to mention the nature of the conviction or the charges. 
The damaging evidence ·was just as potent as though it were a legitimate 
conviction. Denial and defense by the Nonpartisan League leaders only 
made them appear less creditable. 104 
The real League failure in the loyalty issue would seem to have 
been that Townley and other leaders of the League should have been more 
aware of the danger from those they claimed to know as established 
perverters of justice--the opposition. The League leaders were guilty of 
not making a more thorough investigation into the possibility of such a 
decision ,.from the Jackson County Court. 
J . 
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In November 1921, Arthur C. Townley finally began to serve a 
ninety-day jail sentence in Jackson, Minnesota, for "conspiring to dis-
courage enlistments." 
CHAPTER VI 
THE STIGMA OF DISLOYALTY 
The Nonpartisan League and its leadership continued to face 
increasing denunciations of disloyalty. Having found a potent and ready 
weapon to use against the League, the opposition was not going to miss 
any opportunity to take advantage of it. 
The Nonpartisan League and A. C. Townley had been praised by 
President Wilson in a letter in which the President recognized North 
Dakota's efforts to support the war effort through production of agricul-
tural goods, and their support of "the boys at the front. 11 The President 
of the United States found no reason to question their loyalty. The 
office of the Attorney General of the United States had investigated the 
allegations of sedition against the League leaders. These investigations 
were instrumental in the Attorney General's Office clearing the Non-
partisan League and its leaders of any charges of disloyalty. Indeed, 
George Creel of the Justice Department went beyond just words of 
clearance; he praised the activities of the League. In a letter to a 
League historian after the war, Creel stated: 
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I am not at all unwilling to give you my opinion with respect 
to the war attitude of the Nonpartisan League. Never at any time 
did I consider it a disloyal organization. On the contrary, the 
war record of the state of North Dakota, controlled by the League , 
proved conclusively that the membership, taken as a whole, gave 
America faithful and ungrudging support in the hour of need ..• ~ 
I sent for the heads of various agricultural bodies and unions, 
and among those that came to Washington in response to the call 
was Mr. Townley, head of the Nonpartisan League. I found him, 
just as I found the others, full of distrust and suspicions born of 
many lies that he had read and heard. I took him, as I took 
others, to the President himself, and the interview removed every 
doubt as to the necessity of the war and the high purpose of 
America. . . . When Mr. Townley left Washington he had not 
only pledged the full support of his organization to the war, but 
he had struck hands with Mr. Hoover and promised every coop-
. erative effort. These pledges were kept. 105 
In spite of these assurances, Lemke and Townley and other leaders 
of the League could not save themselves from charges of disloyalty. 
Opponents of the League ·and organizations that were trying to elevate 
their own positions by zealous activity found in the League a ready-
made and already accused culprit. 106 They would not let the charges 
die, and the majority of-the press aided them in maintaining the fiction 
of the accusations. Lemke, who more and more was in charge when 
Townley was absent, suffered constantly increasing abuse after 1921, 
even though the war was over; this was partly due to the fact that the 
agricultural Northwest went into a post-war depression, and abuse of the 
League seemed to ease some people 1 s fear. After these events and the 
attendant publicity, neither the League nor Townley was able to recover 
'!!'° 
any former drive or respect. 
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One area of the League 1 s activities suffered the most from this 
stress. The organizational efforts of the League were constantly met 
with already formed attitudes and often misinformed press coverage. In 
an effort to revive his own commitment and to combat the misunderstand-
ing of the people, Townley either offered or agreed to debate William 
Langer in 1921. 
William Langer had emerged from a political background of 
progressivism, his father having spent one session in the North Dakota 
legislature. The father, Frank Langer, refused to return to politics after 
this first encounter. Those who knew. Frank were unanimous in express-
ing the opinion that his distaste for politics resulted from his extreme 
honesty. Unlike his father, William Langer made a lifetime career of 
politics; and unlike his father, honesty did not seem to be an accusation 
often used against him. 
Langer gained his first notable recognition when, as assistant 
states attorney, he zealously attacked bootlegging. This was his basis 
for seeking Nonpartisan support to higher office. Langer had been 
friends with Lemke and other League leaders as a student at the Univer-
sity of North Dakota. He used his friendship with Lemke to aid him in 
getting an endorsement in 1916. Agnes Geelan in her biography, The 
Dakota Maverick: The Political Life of William Langer, stated: 
;i:. 
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He skillfully maneuvered an endorsement to run for attorney 
general from the Nonpartisan League's first nominating and 
endorsing convention in 1916, and it can be said that Bill 
Langer' s progressive political career was launched. lO? 
Having secured the nomination, Langer promptly backed out on the agree-
ment he had made with Lemke. 108 When elected Attorney General of the 
state as part of the Nonpartisan list of endorsed candidates, he had state-
wide attention. His first year in office was hardly over before he began 
to break with the Nonpartisan League. When the break became complete, 
Langer joined forces with the Independent Voters Association, the major 
North Dakota foe of the League. Langer was to reconvert to a Leaguer 
after a setback in his career again made the League necessary to him. 
During his tenure with the Independent Voters Association, Langer became 
a frequent contributor to the anti-League publications in the Red Flame. 
The Red Flame was created as an anti-League medium, and had little 
other purpose; it can be correctly described as a radically conservative 
"rag." 109 This publication was to do more than any other newspaper to 
keep alive the terms "free love," '1bolshevik," and "anti-Christian. " 
The Townley-Langer debate tour throughout Kansas became the most 
continuously absorbing focus of the newspapers throughout Kansas. The 
American Legion of Kansas gave Langer much verbal support in his debate 
tour, presenting him as the representative of Loyalty in his contest with 
th.e disloyal Townley. The C_ourier News on March 30, 1921, carried the 
following comment about Langer as patriot: 
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Oh, dear, no! To the American Legion this man who stayed 
home during the war, and whose patriotism was questioned by 
the extremely patriotic Forum, is the leading exponent of 100 
per cent Americanism .... Can someone please tell us how 
to tell a loyalist from a disloyalist? Is this the test: That 
any man who questions the divine right of Wall Street to rule 
is disloyal, and anyone who upholds Wall Street and its war-
profiteering is loyal? 110 
The widely varied positions of the Red Flame and The Courier News 
were reflected throughout the tour of Kansas in the newspape.rs of over 
twenty-five towns visited by Townley and Langer. These local news-
papers created about the same picture as existed from only the League's 
publication or only the opposition's news. 
The Herrington Times reported: 11 ••• The talks amounted to an 
exchange of bitter personalities, Langer charged Townley with a great 
many things and Townley ignoring them. 11111 The editor concluded that 
the debates were simply a clever manner for gaining an undisturbed hear-
ing for Townley in communities he would not dare visit as an advocate of 
the Nonpartisan League .112 This was due to his position against the war, 
for which he was at that time 11 under jail sentence," 113 a statement that 
was patently untrue. The Concordia Blade-Empire printed Townley's reply 
to the question of 11Why he had been jailed. 11 He stated: 
I made hundreds of speeches during the war, fighting the fight 
of the farmers against the grain gamblers and the beef trusts. 
The government had agents. taking stenographic notes of every-
thing I said. . .. Finally the grain gamblers found a little two 
by four county attorney in Jackson County I Minnesota I who 
would work for them .•.. I was convicted and sentenced to 
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three months in jail. Think of it, three months in jail. And 
think of all the trouble I caused the trusts and grain robbers 
while they were framing [me]. 114 
The most balanced reporting came from the Tiller and Toiler, a Farm-Labor 
publication which characterized two debators according to speaking 
ability. This newspaper stated: 
Langer . . . is a fiery, hammer and tongs debator--rapid, 
impetious, defiant, dogmatic, discourteous, vindictive, 
malicious and verbally ferocious •... Townley is the better 
speaker, calm, deliberate, courteous in word and demeanor 
(with rare exception), gruelingly sarcastic, adroitly ironical 
and damnably plausible. 115 
This was the gener.:al pattern to the reporting of the debates in 
Kansas. The stigma of disloyalty was kept alive, since each newspaper 
made some comment about Townley's trial and sentence for this charge. 
Not one of these newspapers had the correct information concerning the 
conspiracy, and many, having obtained their information from the 
American Defense League, an American Legion auxillary, made ._some 
comment concerning 11 free love," "socialist," and "atheist" or "anti-
Christian. 11116 In most of these newspapers the debates were 
publicized several days before they were to take place. Since the 
standard American Defense League advance news item could hardly be 
called unbiased, Townley never entered a town before he had been 
branded by th~ press as disloyal. He could not escape these charges 
JP 
even in those newspapers that favored him after the debate. 
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Blackorby stated: 
The years of speaking and persecution had told on Townley; 
for a time he did not have as much to give as he had had in 
earlier years. When he was not in the state to take top bill-
ing at League rallies, it was often Lemke's name which was 
used to draw the crowds. . . . But Lemke's preoccupation with 
the North Dakota League did mean that he was becoming less 
and less a guiding influence at national headquarters . 117 
The stigma of dis.loyalty took its toll, and the National Nonpartisan 
League was changing its organization. It was retiring from its front 
ranks those with a stigma of disloyalty. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Nonpartisan League may have been the creation of popular 
leaders who only sensed the changing climate in America and moved out 
of fear; it may have been the product of men imbued with the insight that 
a pattern of life basically agrarian was being replaced by industrialism 
in all its complexity, leading eventually to a morass of inescapable 
problems; in any case, the League was in the forefront of reform at a time 
when faith in the inevitability of progress was disappearing. When one 
seeks to understand the process by which Americans were stripped of 
their tnnocence and faith, there is a temptation to see this as one more 
consequence of the cataclysmic changes wrought by World War I. The 
contrast before and after the war was sharp, but not all of the major 
ideas and attitudes of the preceding era were totally erased. 
This period of the American past contains no more distinctive 
occurrence than the political destruction of leading thinkers and ideals 
of the Progressive Era. The extreme rapidity of this change during the 
six years of the war is hard to- grasp. Leaders who were molding public 
opinion at the outbreak of the war were reduced to ineffective wonderment 
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by the time of its conclusion. This creates a problem of explanation, 
because the swiftness of the change is as important as the content. 
Both A. C. Townley and William Lemke were men of extremes, 
commitment, and sincerity; and briefly they were men of power. They 
failed, however, to recognize adequately the degree of power and com-
mitment possessed by their opponents, and the extremes to which they 
would be willing to go. They did not comprehend that the Independent 
Voters Association, the traditional parties, the milling and grain 
interests, the railroads, and the businessmen were involved in a 
---------------- - ---·-- ----- - - -·----·-·---------·-
struggle that was as important to them as life. The opposition was 
willing and able to use methods that were distasteful to the League. 
Even after 1919 it was highly possible that everything was not 
lost. Restrained actions, careful statements, and the practice of 
moderation in proposed programs might have created the time needed to 
give attention to past gains and consolidation of Midwestern aims. 
Blackorby felt that neither Lemke nor Townley possessed the temperament 
and moderation needed to accomplish retrenchment. 118 The League 
boomed too rapidly into a national organiz~tion. 
The success of the Nonpartisan League as long as it employed non-
partisan tactics and a balance of power position between the traditional 
parties was assured. When the League moved toward a farmer-labor 
~ 
union, it began to take on the characteristics of a third party, but it 
lacked the leadership and breadth of program that such a new status 
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required. Russell suggested that Townley's genius was limited to the 
promotional and organizational work and that he lacked the needed 
qualities to moderate and maintain the flexibility necessary for a 
political nboss. 11119 What began as a farmers and citizens group using 
the machinery and techniques of the traditional political parties became 
a political organization possessing party machinery and techniques of its 
own; it thereby lost its unique cause of success. 
The League's carelessness in defining "the opposition" alienated 
the support and membership of many people who, because of the nature 
of their small-town affinities and occ.upational enterprises / were not 
really the opposition. The farmers alone did not possess as much 
11 sticker" awareness as was required to cement them into a long-standing 
power. They could not manage without the leadership of a Townley to 
work for their own long-run interests. When World War I changed 
attitudes, the "radical" movements were attacked in all sections of the 
country; and it was easy to make the League appear too socialistic and 
foreign dominated. The farmer could not accept being viewed as radical; 
he was easily confused by revolt within hi.s own ranks, as exemplified by 
Langer and the State Library affair, and soon lost faith in the movement. 
The Nonpartisan League of North Dakota achieved massive reforms 
in insurance; in reduction of control by milling, terminal, and transporta-
1' 
tion interests; in banking and loan establishments; and in the nature of 
the state legislature, mal<ing it responsive to the people. It also 
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responded dynamically to World War I and supported the "boys at the 
front. 11 This was all that many League members felt needed to be 
accomplished and allowed them to return to a more conservative outlook. 
These traditionally conservative elements were able to reduce future 
League successes by organizing League-like movements of their own, 
such as the Sound Government League of Minnesota and the Independent 
Voters Association in North Dakota. lZO 
The Nonpartisan League was irreparably damaged by the images of 
anti-yvar programs and disloyalty associated with it. It is evident that 
several members of the League, very important leaders among them, were 
anti-war and opposed government intervention on behalf of England. 
While they continued to detest abuses by industrial and mining interests, 
_they nevertheless supported the sons of the people of the country at war 
with unusual dedication. The national government did not at any time 
find sufficient reason to act against the Nonpartisan League for question-
able loyalty and, indeed, praised the League for its cooperative support 
of the war effort . 
The anti-League reaction in Minnesota, where old guard politics, 
11 Big Biz," banking and railroad interests, and the "kept press 11 were 
dominant, was irascible to a degree which can hardly be explained in 
terms other than. organized hysteria. The clashes between League 
members and opposition forces were violent only when the opposition 
instigated terrorist activities. The war mentality aided League 
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opponents, who found it easy to equate mob action with "Americanism" 
against unusual economic and political ideals. Many League opponents 
held the sadly misguided notion that they could proclaim and bolster their 
own patriotism by mistreating groups with German-Russian ancestry. 
That the League offered a real threat to the traditional political machines, 
economic powers, and conservative newspapers is evident by the degree 
of opposition so swiftly and frenetically mounted against it. 
A. C. Townley, through his speeches and dynamic actions, invited 
retaliation. Bahmer stated: 11 .... at no point does it appear that 
Townley was corrupt; his failure lay rather in his inability to regard the 
opposition as being dedicated to the same extent that he was. 11121 The 
Minnesota court conviction for which he served a jail sentence approaches 
the limits of judicial abuse and in itself seems criminal. Judged on the 
basis of all materials available, neither Townley nor Lemke was disloyal, 
although each opposed inequities in the economic policies of the govern-
ment and was not an Anglophile. Officials in Washington, including the 
President and Justice and Agricultural heads, found no reason for 
questioning their loyalty. Nevertheless, disloyalty charges were 
responsible for the political career wrecking of both Townley and Lemke. 
Neither of them ever fully recovered his former respectability. 
The"power of the press was demonstrated by its response to the 
Leag·ue and the degree to which it is inadequately qualified to interpret 
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most events. In retrospect, the press demonstrated a lack of integrity 
and responsibility that makes questionable the justification of its power. 
Finally, to explain the fate of the League during and after World 
War I, it must be remembered that the irrationality of the voter is easily 
triggered. While he is frequently accurate in his judgment, he is also 
sometimes as fickle as the wind. 
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